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A
Appeal challenging ex parte custody decision struck out for failure to first seek set‑aside of the ex parte proceedings. child custody – best interests of the child; procedural law – ex parte proceedings – requirement to set aside ex parte judgment before appealing; civil procedure – preliminary objections raised at submissions; overriding objective – curable procedural irregularities.
Appeal dismissed: custody and access order upheld; maintenance enforcement requires a separate application under Rule 87. custody and access – best interests principle (s.39 Law of the Child Act) – enforcement of maintenance orders (Rule 87 Juvenile Court Procedure Rules 2016) – distinction between maintenance and custody proceedings; section 42 (foster care) inapplicable
AN UNCORROBORATED EVIDENCE OF A CHILD IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT ACCUSED PERSON
Adoption, effect ofthe adoption order on the the relationship between infornt and PARENT
B
C
Custody to mother upheld; maintenance varied for parental contribution and father’s weekend access increased. best interests of the child – weight of social inquiry report – travel distance to school not decisive; Maintenance – court must consider both parents’ incomes – apportionment of school fees and transport; Visitation – protection of parental access rights, modification of access orders.
Custody and maintenance affirmed for the respondent; pre‑marriage house reallocated from 60/40 to 70/30 in favor of the appellant. custody: welfare of the child paramount; social welfare report not conclusive. Maintenance — parental shared responsibility; amount reasonable. Matrimonial property — pre‑marriage asset can be matrimonial if substantially improved during marriage; non‑monetary contributions require cogent proof; appellate adjustment of apportionment warranted.
Cruelty to Children, Circumstantial Evidence, Silence Means Acceptance, Failure to Consider Mitigating Factors
CONFESSION OF CHILD OFFENDER- JUVENILE- ACCUSED AGED 15 YEARS RECORDED HIS CONFESSION IN THE ABSENCE OF HIS PARENT OR GUARDIAN-WHETHER THE PROCEDURE WAS PROPER- SECTION 4(2) OF THE LAW OF THE CHILD ACT 2009
D
E
F
G
H
High Court authorized District Delegate to continue probate hearing under s54 PAEA and amended Rule 83 for reasons of convenience and jurisdiction. Caveat and appearance – Rule 83 (Amendment 2025) – Section 54(1) and (2) PAEA – High Court discretion to authorize District Delegate to proceed – jurisdiction and convenience.
I
J
JUVENILE COURT- CHILD OFFENDER- TRIAL TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE JUVENILE COURT (NOT DISTRICT COURT) IN THE PRECENCE OF WELFARE OFFICER
JUVENILE-JUVENILE OF 15 YEARS OLD BY AN ADULT COURT- WHETEHR PROPER AND CONVICTION SUSTAIANABLE-RATIONALE FOR TRIAL OF YOUNG PERSONS BEING CONDUCTED BY A JUVENILE COURT- DUTY OF JUVENILE COURT- CONVICTION QUASHED BY APPELLATE COURT WHEN THE JUVENILEN IS 16 YEARS OLD-WHETHER RETRIAL SHOULD BE ORDERED
K
L
M
Maintenance order quashed for lack of credible income evidence; matter remitted for social inquiry report and fresh determination. requirement to consider parents’ income and children’s welfare — social inquiry report — exercise of judicial discretion — remittal under revisional powers.
MAINTANANCE OF INFRANT CHILD, CLAIM FOR ARREAS OF MAINTANANCE OF INFRANT CHILD, WHETHER IT IS A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR A CIVIL WRONG UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW
N
O
P
PURPOSE OF ADOPTION MUST BE TO PROMOTE THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD BETTER THAN NTHE EXISTING ARRANGEMENT
Q
R
S
SENTENCING- JUVENILE CONVICT- PURPOSE OF SENTENCE TO JUVENILE CONVICTS- FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN SENTENCING A JUVENILE CONVICT
SETENCING-FIRST OFFENDER- AGED 18-SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT FINE OPTION- LAW PROVIDES FOR AN OPTION OF FINE- WHETHER SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT PROPER
SENTENCING -WHETHER THE AGE OF THE ACCUSED IS IN THE BORDERLINE BETWEEN A YOUNG PERSON AND ADULT, MEDICAL EVIDENCE SHOULD BE CALLED FOR TO DETERMINE THE PRECISE AGE OF THE ACCUSED FOR PROPER TRIAL PROCEDURE AND SETENCING
SENTENCING- DUTY OF THE COURT TO ASCETAINTAIN THE AGE OF THE ACCUSED WHERE IT IS UNCERTAIN AS WHETHER HE IS BELOW OR ABOVE 18 YEARS-BENEFICTS OF DOUBTS AS TO SUCH AGE BE GIVEN TO THE ACCUSED- SECTION 119(1) OF THE CHILD ACT-2009
SENTENCING-RAPE-A BOY OF 18 YEARS OR LESS, IF FIRST OFFENDER, IS TO BE SENTENCED TO CORPORAL PUNISHMENT ONLY- SECTION 131(2)(a) OF THE PENAL CODE
SENTENCING-AGE OF THE ACCUSED BEING A DETERMINANT IN SENTENCING- TWO- DIFFERENT DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING AGE OF THE ACCUSED- WHETHER COURT MAY PROCEED TO SENTENCE WITHOUT ASCERTAINING AGE OF THE ACCUSED
SENTENCING -RAPE -APPROPRIATE SENTENCE FOR THE OFFENCE OF RAPE- AGE OF THE VICTIM OF RAPE IS IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING APPROPRIATE SENTENCE- SECTION 131 OF THE PENAL CODE
SENTENCING IN RAPE CASES- ACCUSED COMMITTED SECOND OFFENCE AGED “18 YEARS”- SENTENCED AS AN ADULT-WHETHER SENTENCE LEGALLY PROPER- SECTION 13192) OF THE PENAL CODE
T
THE TRIAL OF A CHILD-FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE AGE OF A CHILD-FAILURE TO AFFORD A CHILD THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD ON HIS AGE IS FATAL
U
V
W
Y